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Every 5 to 8 years’ large waves of capital spending occur known as MEGA Projects. 
These projects are effectively 1 or more Billion US dollars in Total Installed costs 
(TIC). When these projects are part of a global race to fill a void in the current 
marketplace, a serious race to be first to market or otherwise known as “Prime 
Mover” becomes the main driver and rapid deployment of resources. The reward for 
being the first to market is a higher (shorter) ROI (return on investment) cycle than 
other competitors and the ability to capture more customers than other competitors. 
 
This paper will explore the challenges of being first to market and how that can 
affect meeting PHA/LOPA and ultimately achieving required SIL Targets and the 






Each year Owner/Operators and Engineering and Construction contractors meet the 
week following Labor Day at a Conference known as ECC. This year’s ECC event was 
very much focused on the facts that in the world of heavy capital spending and MEGA 
Projects as a huge component of the overall capital spending yield significant failure 
rates in achieving their goals. The findings are: 
 98% of projects overrun both their budget and their schedule 
 Budget overruns on average are 40% 
 Schedule overruns are on average 20 months 
 
As our Mary Kay O’Connor Process Safety Center sets the tone as a Center of 
Excellence around PSM and all those things under it, I found the fact that I was 
involved in several of these MEGA Projects and that in each of them there was an 
interesting and disturbing trend to assume that PSM needs were being handled as they 
should be, when in fact they were not. 
 
There are reasons why the PSM needs were being compromised and we will discuss 




Just what are the challenges faced in EPC/Owner executed projects from a PSM and DHS 
perspective 
 
1. Getting the scope right from the beginning. 
 
Getting the scope right for Greenfield Capital projects from the beginning has become 
even more important than in previous times because of the tight timelines these 
projects must maintain and the proper use of investment funds being able to be more 
closely scrutinized in near real time metrics. 
 
More and more many of these multi-billion dollar investments are executed as Joint 
Ventures between interested parties and include external financing in many cases. 
The Jurisprudence aspect of properly forecasting the cash flow and returns on 
investment has never been as critical as it is in these highly volatile times. The net 
effect is this closer scrutiny stimulates an urgency to get to market on time or 
potentially miss the market window upon which you proposed the ROI. (Return On 
Investment) 
 
From and PSM (Process Safety Management) and constantly emerging DHS 
(Department of Homeland Security) set of standards/mandates owner-operators and 
detailed design contractors must be clear about the applicable regulatory requirements 
and the impacts of getting them wrong in the project gating processes even as early 
on as the conceptual phase. 
 
If the wrong assumptions about: 
 which parts of the project are mature enough to base the financial risk on 
 just how their timing in achieving the stated requirements is misunderstood 
 or critical requirements are simply overlooked due to a lack of understanding,  
the projects set themselves up for delays, extra costs and perhaps claims between 
partners and suppliers of malfeasance.   
(Definition -Malfeasance is bad behavior, especially from persons of authority 
who should know better.) 
 
2. Additional Compliance with DHS impacts beyond conventional SIS 
 
The addition of Cyber-Security risks to the other already known risks faced in 
numerous phases of a projects life-cycle make it important to know and follow the 
DHS needs starting in the conceptual phase and committing to the needs to protect the 
facility from cyber attached.  
 
While this is important to all aspects of the facility it brings additional demands on 
the SIS (Safety Instrument System) design, almost returning prudent SIS designs back 
to the 1980’s regiment of total separation via hardwired interfaces only, from any 
system that is connected to the internet. Web-based software updates and remote 
configuration invite hackers to the critical safety loops and even connectivity to lower 
level networks in a tradition four level network hierarchy are susceptible to hacks of 
the firewalls between them. Managing these risks out of a critical systems 
architecture are best managed by eliminating them to start with.  
New versions of Stuxnet are being pioneered constantly and it is important to 
remember that the target of the Stuxnet virus was a SIL 3 Safety rated PLC. 
 
The next steps in this regards is the merger of current ISA 84.01 and IEC 62443 
Standards to effectively meet a global standard that can be used as “RAGAGEP” in 
our US 29 CFR OSHA 1910.119 statute for our Process Industries. 
 
The merger of these standards are the way towards a release and targeted for release 
in either late 2016 or early 2017. 
 
Currently only a few owner-operators are following the DHS cyber rules that got 
established in 2014. A few prominent owner-operators that produce highly volatile 
petrochemical and biological products have attempted to move ahead of having to 
play catchup by isolating critical systems such as Telecoms and SIS systems into a 
hardened environment that stops cyber intrusion from the beginning, i.e.…. practicing 
Situational Awareness in not inviting the uninvited in design to avoid the risk to start 
with. In this case old school segregation of critical functions and systems is the new 
hola-hoop.   
 
Lessons Learned from Post 2010 Project Execution Phases 
 
While the recent economic setback from the lower cost of various energy sectors is 
having another major impact in what we will eventually look back on as the 2014/2015 
loss of oil revenues, the projects we are focusing our paper on are those projects that 
became part of the recovery post 2008 setback. These projects triggered the economic 
upswing of 2010/2011 benefiting from the cheaper feedstocks from the excess amounts 
of Shale Gas and various strategies around conversion of cheaper Ethane to Ethylene and 
their Derivatives products. 
 
For the first time in decades’ new major US capital projects funding to the tune of $70Bn 
worth became affordable and fed the downstream chemical industry in a US Chemical 
products wave of US world scale projects that financially support US Petrochemical 
production independence. This wave of new Petrochemical infrastructure and an 
opportunity for increased market share dominance in the US plastics manufacturing 
industry became the turnaround of the 2008 setback. 
 
These large Ethane-centric capital projects average between $5Bn to $11Bn, and are 
underway in a race to meet their business performance models that were used to obtain 
their FID (Funding Investment Decisions) in the first place. 
 
While some are at lower risk than others due to specific reasons, in general they all have 
the following minimum deliverables that must flow out of the development gates that we 
in the Process Safety sector have the responsibility of helping mature.  
 
 
The deliverables in any general gating process are simplified as follows: 
 Conceptual Design / Pre-FEED 
 FEED 
 FEED Assurance or EWP (Early Work Projects) 
 Detailed Engineering  
 Construction. 
 
It is rare that during the Conceptual/Pre-FEED stages for them to put much effort into 
assuring our PSM needs are thought through in any real detail, but as more and more 
emphasis on Proper Land Use comes into play, that situation will change.  
 
Our paper is focused on the three project development phases that drive our PSM needs 
into the construction phases.  
  
1. FEED (Level I PHA) 
 
FEED (Front End Engineering Development) generally anything from 6 months to 18 
months in timeline development is the work post conceptual efforts to identify the 
overall process needs and other deliverables of a capital project. In each of the 
projects we know about, it is in this phase of work - sometimes done in competitive 
style of using more than one EPC think tank to against another to make sure fewer 
design anomalies might exist and the differences between these groups submittals can 
be compared to learn from and aid in assurances that a proper budget and primary 
process validation model has been developed. 
 
 
For us in the Process Safety sector the FEED key deliverables for all the process units 
and their ancillaries involved are: 
A. Level I PHA 
B. Risk Tolerance Matrix 
C. SRS (Safety Requirements Specification) 
D. Preliminary LOPA (Layers of Protection Analysis) 
E. IPL (Independent Protection Layer Analysis) based on PHA Level I 
Safeguard Assumptions 
 
In 4 of the 6 shale gas spurred Ethane to Ethylene projects none of the deliverables 
above were developed to the proper stages before the FEED funds were exhausted or 
the FEED schedule forced an early cutoff to the FEED. 
  
Of those 4 projects all have failed to meet their FID projections The only consistent 
deliverables made to base FID off of were items A and B above.  
 
Unilaterally blind-eyes were turned to items C, D and E, which not only impacts the 
FID it majorly impacts the ROI business model as time to market is unable to be 
achieved in sequence with FID. 
 
Further across the board – none of the ancillary packages whether they were from key 
licensors of guaranteed process performances, compression equipment suppliers 
etc.…. provided ISA S84/IEC 61508/61511 – “RAGAGEP” compliant solutions 
during the FEED stage. 
 
On average there are 45+ such packaged units/sub-system units in these types of 
plants. Each of those packaged units/sub-system units required a PHA and the other 
deliverables listed as items A, C, D or E.  
 
Since none of the supplier packages used to work up the FEED deliverables provided 
any of the key deliverables, PSM needs were missed entirely in the funding and 
scheduling studies produced in the FEED.  
 
The chain reaction of this series of missed deliverables in some cases did not show up 
until detailed design level 3 PHA’s and level 3 LOPA’s.  
 
In other instances, finishing that work became so out of sequence, work in those areas 
has been deferred until later and will become part of as built efforts, not an ideal 
scenario to train operations and maintenance personnel off of, or establish the best of 
life-cycle engineering work practices.  
  
1. Early Works Projects (Level II PHA & LOPA I) 
 
Since not all the missed deliverables in the FEED came from process safety gaps, 
several of the capital investors looked to what are commonly referred to Early Works 
Projects (EWP) which becomes a limited head start to Detailed Engineering done on 
a limited set of funding prior to full FID. These EWP’s are using done by those one 
would want to award the Detailed Engineering to prime the pump for a rapid detailed 
engineering start. EWP’s can when done well capture the gaps of a “lite” FEED, and 
are always expected to pay for themselves in reducing time to construction as the 
several month long EWP is used to establish terms, get commitments on schedules 
and budget and push the EWP EPC to a Lump Sum basis of award, pushing the 
financial and schedule risk off to the EPC. 
During EWP activities our PSM deliverables are typically advancements to the same 
ones in FEED but at a minimum the target is to get to: 
 Level III PHA that matches the refined P&ID’s  
 A next level LOPA based on the new safeguards discovered during the EWP 
activities. 
 
So what do you think happens when the FEED work assumptions change and you 
didn’t really due a LOPA in the first place?  
 
The typical answer is we didn’t know what we needed to know in the FEED and as 
expected the EWP activities have flagged up the new gaps we must take care of in the 
next phase. This excuse for not fully addressing prior to the start of the Detailed 
Engineering. 
 
Providing the new discovery is progress but the reality is the EWP work is anywhere 
from 6 months to 12 months further down the project time line and so the failure to 
meet the scheduled activities for PSM sets the project up to having to compromise the 
advancements that support the start of Detailed Engineering and now other discipline 
work efforts such as piping, safe distances between equipment, proper egress in and 
out of the process units starts to move so far to the right of the FID schedule that 
shortcuts and promises of parallel activities being able to make up for this lost time.  
 
Never forget that time is money, and when monetary limitations begin to be exceeded 
or are stretched, future activities get constrained and can begin putting pressure on 
dangerous comprises of prudent facility needs as priorities get reshuffled to hold 
budget. 
 
Capital Projects use the FEED and EWP to validate what is known as Final Funding 
Approval, and so any of the deficiencies are either accounted for as project risk 
factors and contingencies to cover them get added to the overall budget or in as is the 
case in too many instances as looked at a cost and schedule reduction targets. Some 
Owner/Operators and EPC’s would consider this a “rebase-lining” of the budget and 
schedule. Some would consider it the second bite at the cherry. 
 
Cost pressure at this stage reaches a new focal point and if we didn’t get our PSM 
needs into the budget by this time, they are subject to being ignored in the following 
stage of Detailed Engineering. 
 
In each of the 4 affected projects, as FEED and Early Works activities wrapped up 
they were on average 3.5+ years into these 4 projects without maybe as much as 60% 
of the real PSM needs having been properly communicated or identified. Each of 
these projects found themselves running thin on acceptable reasons for more cost 
additions and under pressure to make-up for the lost time.  
 
Remember the first 5 deliverables: 
A. Level I PHA 
B. Risk Tolerance Matrix 
C. SRS (Safety Requirements Specification) 
D. Preliminary LOPA (Layers of Protection Analysis) 
E. IPL (Independent Protection Layer Analysis) based on PHA Level I Safeguard 
Assumptions 
 
While various attempts at satisfying 1 thru 4 above, each of these projects ignored 
establishing IPL’s (E) above in the early stages and the net result of that is the odds of 
having a semi worthy LOPA or a SRS sufficiently completed to issue meaningful 
orders for long lead SIS equipment hadn’t even been addressed. 
 
2. Detailed Engineering (Level III PHA & LOPA II +++) 
 
So by now the theme of having shortcut and or missed several of our critical 
HSE/PSM deliverables to approach real needs prior to the Detailed Engineering start 
has been established in the A & B discussions preceding this phase of the gated work 
processes. 
 
Hence the deliverables issued or not, going in to Detailed Engineering at best were 
derived from abbreviated or postponed efforts for the sake of time and money and 
now those omissions, bad assumptions and neglected activities in those previous 
phases all gets dumped on the Detailed Engineering task to sort out and or generate so 
late in the game. 
 
The reality of having less HSE/PSM work in hand to be efficient and effective during 
Detailed Engineering puts an added burden upon what should or could have been the 
next steps towards completing (Phase III) PHA and LOPA activities.  
 
Instead now the tasks have become concurrent attempts to complete the purposes of 
stepping stone activities all in the same time frame. This puts such an added burden 
on Management of Change that it stalls out the completion of the Detailed 
Engineering process, or leads to deferment of critical tasks and leaving them 
venerable to not being done at all. 
 
As is evidenced by many of these projects having had to request additional funding, 
and issuing Press Releases to cover the set back to schedule and investors ROI, this is 
not an isolated occurrence. 
 
The fact that the risk of budget shortages and schedule slippage get announced due to 
Truth in Lending regulations etc.…. Sadly, that does not mean that the risk of missing 
PSM, EPA, DHS deliverables or personal safety targets ever gets revealed outside of 
the project teams themselves.  
 
Since these projects are made up of various processes licensor packages and other key 
sub-systems, the need to communicate and harmonize all of the scope to one 
consistent Risk Matrix from which all the other PSM alignment activities take place, 
the need to communicate that set of needs as early as possible is fairly obvious. 
 
The unfortunate fact is this level of communication really doesn’t occur until Detailed 
Engineering takes place as part of the challenge to these projects is spending as little 
as possible during the FEED and EWP segments of the facility’s development. 
 
It is important to capture the dichotomy between the concepts of “Time is Money” 









Each of the previously discussed postponed elements of scope development present the 
owner/operator, EPC and process licensor packages with an overflowing watershed of 
scope that must be brought back into balance. 
 
The impacts from this set of late to be dealt with deliverables have unforgivable effects to 
Schedule and Budget and become new ROI threats in themselves. 
  
1. Schedule 
Other than the simple and obvious shift to the right in schedule adherence, the 
compounding aspects of trying to meet RAGAGEP show up primarily as follows: 
 
 Out of Sequence Engineering Impact 
 
When schedule predecessors are ignored or postponed (deferred), the 
ability to properly move the project’s requirements forward and it 
obstructs the ability to foresee or forecast accurately as to when the right 
succeeding activities and be finalized.  
 
The project finds itself in a ‘Do-Loop” that only gets more exacerbating as 
less involved managers ask why it is a “circular reference” of sorts and the 
pressure on those executing the work becomes even more criticized than 
before taking the final resolution at ties further away from true closure. 
 
The pressure to torture the statistics to meet expectations worsens and a 
collaborative and cohesive engineering environment gradually decays. 
  
 Rework to Meet LOPA Risk Reduction Impact 
 
In this phase of the project as well, the pressure to find or make up new 
LOPA/IPL angles to meet the needs to show RISK Reduction has reached 
maturity overnight, that new bad assumptions can surface, and the same 
aspects of the “Do-Loop” previously mentioned now hits at the heart of 
our PSM basics. 
 
In this phase of things, I am proud to say real PSM and HSE individuals 
usually rise to the surface of there being no room for compromise, and a 
“HSE Re-baselining” event takes place as the project’s ability to mask the 
bad assumptions that led it to this state of being get dealt with. Sadly, 





 Specialty Design Package Impact 
 
It should come a no surprise that the LOPA/IPL voids in the specialty 
packages surfaces in the same time line as above and so finally the rework 
to third party packagers takes place.  
 
The net result here is Management of Change sparks change orders to 
correct things to what they should be, and one of the inevitable sayings in 
the EPC industry comes into play in that “It is what it is”. One of the 
reason this saying surfaces so late in the series of events is to take that 
approach too early in the life-cycle of the project would be deemed a “fait 
accompli” too soon. 
 
 Average Schedule Slippage for the Ethane to Ethylene projects studied is 
18 to 28 months beyond the approved FID Schedule. That translates to a 
slippage of approximately 35% on the range of 42 to 60 month schedules 
approved at FID. 
 
2. Costs 
 “Time is Money” versus “Money Well Spent” 
 
In the Early Phased Gates of FEED and EWP we touched on the fact that 
moving these phases forward quickly was important as the Final Funding 
Decision or Final Investment Funding (FID) is usually contingent on these 
two steps having been completed with some degree of certainty, in a perfect 
world that might be a +/- 10% definition of costs.  
 
Parallel to this build up to FID is a constant market analysis study that 
balances the ROI based on just when products from these investments hit 
the market. Analysts reward or penalize the ROI depending on when 
compared to demand for the products and against those the investment 
competes with. 
 
Early ROI gets calculated in numerous ways but one of the compelling 
drivers of being early to finish and get to market first is a hedge against 
entering the market when it is saturation. Supply and Demand is an 
important consideration as an investor hones in on the “Rush, Walk or 
Stroll” to the finish line pace of investment. 
 
In these examined projects around the Ethane to Ethylene expansions, being 
first to market at one time commanded a $1.2Bn ROI advantage. Being the 
“Prime Mover” is one of those such terms. 
 
Obviously there can logically only be one 1st place winner, and that quest 
can unfortunately drive such a “Time is Money” set of blinders that it 
confuses the aspect of making sure one’s investment achieves a “Money 
Well Spent” balancing act that really exists once the real accounting gets 
done. 
 
 Missed Market Window Impacts on ROI. 
 
So what happens when you miss being the “Prime Mover” or fail to get on 
the front end of “Supply and Demand” metrics? 
 
The obvious answer is investors look to do further analysis as to why their 
expenditures failed to give them the assurances that convinced them to agree 
to FID in the first place. If the Investor/Owner/Operator is publicly traded it 
can be a wide swing in investor confidence problem that gets faced. 
 
If you barrowed funds from banks, there will usually be an investigation as 
to has there been any “Malfeasance”.  
 





If We Really Learned from the Lessons these projects can teach us, We Would? 
 
One needs to understand that just because a Lesson is observed and recorded, it isn’t 
necessarily the same thing as the Lesson having been Learned. 
 
A learned Lesson aspires to the goal of not being an error or anomaly that we fail to 
see happening to us the next time. 
 
We would hope not to make the same mistakes twice if we really Learned our 
Lessons. 
 
So what might be some quick HSE/PSM/EPA take away lessons from these studied 
projects to improve upon going forward? 
 
3. Insist that FEED Deliverables include both Variable and Fixed Price Licensor and 
EPC Bid Packages that leading up to the FID trigger: 
 Meet the applicable PSM and Environmental Standards by Addressing: 
 PHA’s and LOPA’s Based on the Owner’s Risk Tolerance 
Matrices  
 DHS Cyber Security Requirements 
 Approved Flare Permits 
 HSE Toxicology needs for both inside and outside the fence-line. 
 Responsible Community Planning inclusive of Land Management 






4. Insist that unless all above are fully dealt with prior to any Funding Investment 
Decision: 
 The FEED is incomplete and leaves the Owners and other investors at risk 
of: 
1. 40% over runs in costs 
2. 30% over runs in schedule 
3. Jeopardizing its business plans and goals for its shareholders., i.e... 
Impairing Financial Viability and ROI Metrics 
5. Never allow pressures of schedule or price to take precedent over HSE/PSM/DHS 
or other prevailing Safety Factors and hold those who might attempt to 
compromise those needs opportunities to be properly developed in the sequence 
they need to be held personally accountable. 
 Every Person, Supplier and Subcontractor along the path of the project’s 
deliverables and key decisions must all sign off on having been properly 
trained in the Safety Life-Cycle requirements under OHSA.  
 
Summary - Our responsibilities to each other and those we serve……. 
 
OSHA Process Safety Management (PSM) and EPA Risk Management Planning (RMP) 
are very detailed, complex regulations that apply to facilities using threshold amounts of 
highly hazardous chemicals. The complexity of these regulations, bring serious 
challenges to companies who elect to develop PSM and RMP programs in-house.  
 
The challenge of incorporating the 14 elements established in the OSHA Process Safety 
Management standard, particularly with the recent changes due to reiterating the focus on 
using Recognized and Generally Accepted Good Engineering Practices (RAGAGEP) to 
develop Process Safety and Risk Management programs.  
 
If we fail to properly manage and support the needs outlined and discussed in this paper, 
we set ourselves up to contribute to increased systematic failure rates due to the excessive 
pressure to reduce price over properly respecting and dealing with critical HSE risk 
factors. 
 
Detecting, reporting, and responding to abnormal situations or events are all important 
functional elements of a complete process automation strategy. Traditional control 
systems present this information in the form of alarms directed to the operations staff on 
the control system console. In abnormal situations, the volume of these alarms floods can 
present a present a significant challenge as operators are subjected to too much 
information at once. 
Process-related alarms are only one type of alert typically presented to the operations 
staff. For example, the growing importance of industrial control systems (ICS) 
cybersecurity means that security-related events must also be captured and managed.  
The ISA/IEC 62443 series of standards on industrial automation and control systems 
security explicitly state that security-related events and alerts must be collected and 
maintained for analysis. The standards implicitly assume that once this information is 
collected, someone will be available to interpret it and take the appropriate action. 
Automation solution providers and end users must focus not only on the nature of the 
information, but how to express it and, most importantly, to whom. More research and 
development is required in this area. End users must state clear requirements and 
expectations as to the types of in-formation they require when describing anomalous 
behavior in their processes. 
 
